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Abstract 
An important economic paradox in the economic literature is that countries with abundant 
natural resources are poor in terms of real gross domestic product per capita. This paradox, 
known as the ‘resource curse’, is contrary to the conventional intuition that natural resources 
help to improve economic growth and prosperity. Using panel data for 95 countries, this study 
revisits the resource curse paradox in terms of oil resources abundance for the period 1980–
2017. In addition, the study examines the role of trade openness in influencing the relationship 
between oil abundance and economic growth. The study finds trade openness is a possible 
avenue to reduce the resource curse, in our sample, trade openness reduces oil curse by around 
25%. Trade openness allows countries to obtain competitive prices for their resources in the 
international market and access advanced technologies to extract resources more efficiently. 
Therefore, natural resource–rich economies can reduce the resource curse by increasing 
exposure to international trade. 
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1. Introduction 
The conventional intuition is that natural resources help to increase a country’s economic 
growth and development. Contrary to this, the literature reports that countries rich in natural 
resources tend to have lower real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita than resource-poor 
countries—this paradox is known as the ‘resource curse’ [see, e.g., Auty (1993), Sachs and 
Warner (1995), Gylfason (2000) and Van der Ploeg (2011)].1 For example, oil-rich countries 
such as Venezuela, Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo are poor in terms of real GDP per 
capita, while some resource-poor countries such as Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong 
have very high real GDP per capita.2 The literature identifies several factors that explain this 
paradox such as poor institutional quality, political rent-seeking, commodity price volatility 
and lack of diversification. However, several other factors remain unexplored.  
The main objectives of this paper are to: (i) estimate the oil curse (rather than the 
resource curse) in dynamic panel data setting; (ii) investigate the impact of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which was established in 1995 on the oil curse; (iii) examine the role of 
trade openness as a channel that may reduce the oil  curse.  
Trade openness increases real GDP per capita in a resource-rich country in different 
ways. Our hypothesis is that increased trade helps to lessen the resource curse by reallocating 
resources more efficiently. It provides countries access to the international market and higher 
prices for their products. This access to international prices increases the country’s income and 
real GDP per capita. Trade openness also makes available opportunities to use advanced 
technologies for more efficient extraction of natural resources. With the use of new 
technologies, natural resource–rich countries can produce intermediate and final goods from 
                                                            
1
 The term ‘resource curse’ was first coined by Auty (1993) to explain the negative relationship between resource 
dependency and economic growth. 
2
 Note that this is not true for all countries. For example, oil-rich countries such as Norway, Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar have high GDP per capita. 
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primary goods and earn more profits. Trade openness helps to modernise the entire economy 
by improving other related sectors such as roads and transport systems (Pedersen 2000), 
financial sectors (Braun & Raddatz 2008) and bureaucratic systems (Dutt 2009). Overall, trade 
openness plays a crucial role in converting natural resources into a blessing rather a curse. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) for the 
period 1980–2017.3 
Figure 1: Relation between real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) in countries 
with high oil reserves. 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2019). 
Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2011) investigate the role of trade and institutions in 
reducing the resource curse and find that the resource curse becomes weaker in countries with 
a high degree of trade openness. In their seminal study, Sachs and Warner (1995) also find that 
trade openness improves economic growth by reducing the resource curse. However, most of 
these studies are based on cross-section growth models, where the average growth over recent 
decades is regressed on a measure of resource abundance and a selection of control variables. 
                                                            
3 Throughout this study, we use change in real GDP per capita and economic growth interchangeably. 
CAN
IRN
IRQ
KWT
LBY
NGA
OMN
RUS
USA
VEN
YDR
SAU
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
0 10 20 30 40 50
R
e
a
l 
G
D
P
 p
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
Oil rent (% of GDP)
4 
 
In this study, we use a dynamic panel data framework to investigate the impact of trade 
openness on the resource curse. A dynamic panel framework has the advantage of reducing 
serial correlation.4 This is one of the few studies to explore the relationship between the 
resource curse and trade openness in a dynamic panel data framework (rather than cross-
sectional long-term perspective).5  
This study uses an unbalanced dynamic panel data model that covers 95 countries for 
the period 1980–2017. The period of study and choice of countries included in the study are 
based on data availability from the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Before 1980, the data is only available for few countries. Therefore, unbalanced panel data is 
preferred to maximise the degree of freedom as for some countries data only starts in 1992.  
We use the data for the full sample period (1980–2017) and also provide estimation by 
splitting the sample period into two subsample periods: 1980–1994 (before the WTO) and 
1995–2017 (after the WTO). We concur that the commencement of the WTO in 1995 
contributed to significant increases in international trade and the increased trade helps to lessen 
the resource curse through efficient allocation of resources. Moreover, many countries reduced 
their trade tariffs under the WTO agreements which has helped to boost international trade 
during the last two decades.6 For example, China abolished non-tariff barriers and reduced 
tariffs in the manufacturing sector after it joined the WTO in 2001. This significantly increased 
the demand for metals such as copper, aluminium, and steel (Coates & Luu 2012). This 
                                                            
4 In our dynamic panel data model (equation 1), the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is 2.02 that indicates there is 
no serial auto-correlation. However, when we exclude the lag dependent variable from the model, the value of the 
DW statistic is 1.16 which is much lower than the standard value that indicates the presence of serial 
autocorrelation.  
5 Few studies use panel data models to discuss the resource curse hypothesis. By using a panel data model 
consisting of 56 countries from 1972–2000, Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011) found that point resource 
dependence harms economic growth in developing countries. Similarly, Goderis (2008) found the existence of 
resource curse by using panel data for 130 countries for the period 1963–2003. 
6
 The WTO is an intergovernmental organisation that deals with the regulation of trade in goods, services and 
intellectual property between participating countries by providing a framework for negotiating trade agreements 
and a dispute resolution process.  
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increased demand probably had an exogenous impact on the growth of other countries. For 
example, Andersen et al. (2014) empirically found that China’s access to the WTO contributed 
to improving the growth rate in sub-Saharan African countries. 
This study focuses on oil as a natural resource because it is a highly tradeable 
commodity. As oil price is directly linked to the production process, it may have a significant 
impact on inflation, employment and output (Guo & Kliesen 2005). Moreover, point-source 
resources such as oil are more prone to rent-seeking that leads to resource curse (Isham et al. 
2005; Boschini, Pettersson & Roine 2007).7 In this study, we use oil rent (% of GDP) as a 
measure of natural resource abundance.8 Although our study finds the existence of the resource 
curse, trade openness significantly decreases the resource curse problem, especially after the 
introduction of the WTO. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, no previous studies have examined trade openness as a transmission channel for 
reducing the resource curse by using dynamic panel data models. Second, using panel data 
allows us to evaluate the effect of trade openness over time and, particularly, the impact of the 
dramatic changes that followed the commencement of the WTO. Finally, the time dimension 
of the panel data allows us to include periods of importance such as the global financial crisis 
and European sovereign debt crisis. 
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the resource curse 
literature. Section 3 describes the conceptual framework of the importance of trade. The 
                                                            
7
 A point-source resource is a resource concentrated in a single identifiable location (i.e., not diffused in wide 
areas). 
8
 Following Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and Schneider (2012); Arezki and Brückner (2011); Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2010), we use oil rents (% of GDP) as a proxy of natural resource abundance. Rents are basically net profits from 
resource extraction, defined as the value of the product minus total cost of production. Rents measure the value 
of natural resources for a country. More precisely, they provide a less ambiguous measure of resource dependence 
compared with those previously used such as primary commodity exports, oil exports and reserves. For robustness, 
we use the natural resource rent (% of GDP). We define ‘abundance’ as the resource contributing a large share of 
a country’s GDP. 
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methodology of this study is described in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data and description 
of the variables and Section 6 presents the empirical results from panel data estimations. 
Section 7 provides our conclusions and directions for future studies. 
 
2. Overview of the resource curse literature 
To study the role of natural resources in economic growth, it is essential to investigate the 
mechanisms that link endowments of natural resources to poor economic performance. In the 
literature, various economic and political reasons have been discussed for the failure to 
transform natural resources into economic growth including the ‘Dutch disease’, political rent-
seeking and corruption, poor institutional quality, commodity price volatility and lack of 
diversification. We discuss these factors in detail in the following sections. 
2.1. The Dutch disease 
One of the most common economic reasons suggested for the resource curse is the popularly 
known Dutch disease. In most resource-rich countries, sectors other than resources are likely 
to suffer from a real appreciation of the national currency due to natural resource earnings, in 
part, being absorbed by the domestic non-tradeable sectors.9 This results in exports from the 
non-resources sectors (usually manufacturing) become more expensive relative to the world 
market, thus making those sectors less competitive. Consequently, total national income is 
reduced, ultimately causing economic growth to slow. This mechanism is known as the 
‘spending effect’. 
2.2. Political rent-seeking and corruption 
                                                            
9
 Corden (1984) first developed the Dutch disease model. Iimi (2007) described Dutch disease as the most 
prominent channel of the resource curse. Sachs and Warner (1995) argued that the Dutch disease is responsible 
for the slow economic growth of resource-rich African countries. 
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According to Gylfason (2000), the powerful political elites of resource-rich countries can 
control revenues from natural resources. These elites tend to distribute the windfall revenues 
for the benefit of their own existing business and personal networks, instead of investing them 
in the development sectors. Such conflict discourages both domestic and international 
investment which also leads to lower economic growth. Antonakakis et al. (2017) suggest that 
controlling for the quality of political institutions is important in terms of the resource curse 
hypothesis. They argue that the resource curse is prevalent mainly in the developing and 
medium-high income countries. 
2.3. Poor institutional quality 
According to Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) and Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011), 
a country’s institutional quality plays an important role in determining whether an abundance 
of natural resources is a blessing or a curse. It is argued that high levels of growth in resource-
rich countries are due to the way in which rents from natural resources are distributed through 
existing institutional arrangements. If institutional quality is good, a generous endowment of 
natural resource is a blessing. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) argue that the adverse effect 
of natural resource abundance on economic growth will be dissipated if institutional quality is 
improved. 
2.4. Commodity price volatility 
Commodity price volatility is another important channel for the resource curse. According to 
Bellemare, Barrett and Just (2013), and Dwyer, Gardner and Williams (2011) commodity price 
volatility generates uncertainty in the economy, delays stability in the budget, undermines the 
predictability of economic planning and potentially contributes to lower economic growth. 
Moreover, countries in this situation can expect to face stringent constraints on their borrowing 
capacity as financial markets are not only aware of the default risk that volatility generates but 
8 
 
will also be mindful that aggregate consumption and real investment decrease in times of 
commodity price volatility. These dynamics will likely lead to lower economic growth.10 
2.5. Lack of diversification 
Another reason for the resource curse is the lack of economic diversification in countries with 
abundant natural resources. The major share of export earrings in these countries is generated 
from just one or a few resources. This leads to economic vulnerability from exogenous shocks 
and results in slow economic growth (De Ferranti et al. 2002).  
There is considerable literature on the above-mentioned transmission channels that give 
rise to the resource curse, but only scant discussion about the dynamics associated with trade 
openness are found. Therefore, this study, which investigates the role of trade openness using 
panel data models, brings a new dimension to the resource curse literature. 
 
3. Conceptual framework: Importance of trade in resource-rich countries 
The uneven geographical distribution of resource endowment between countries plays a 
critically important part in explaining the significance of trade openness. Most of the world’s 
natural resources are concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, while many 
countries have limited or no natural resources. For example, about 90 per cent of the world’s 
proven oil reserves are in just 13 countries (BP 2017).11 Consequently, international trade plays 
                                                            
10
 According to Salim and Rafiq (2011); and Guo and Kliesen (2005), consumer demand decreases due to the 
adoption of a precautionary savings mindset by consumers who are worried and uncertain about future income 
and unemployment levels as they are fearful that these levels may be adversely impacted during a period of 
commodity price volatility. Consequently, real investment decreases during periods of price volatility (Masih, 
Peters & De Mello 2011; Henriques & Sadorsky 2011 and Guo & Kliesen 2005). Antonakakis et al. (2018) shows 
that oil price volatility impacts the stock value of large oil and gas companies.   
11
 The Middle East countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, United Arab Emirate, Qatar, Yemen and 
Oman) contain about 48 per cent of the world’s total oil reserve, and Venezuela contains nearly 18 per cent as of 
2016. The distribution of other fuels is also concentrated in a very small number of countries. For example, 10 
countries possess 80 per cent of global natural gas reserves in 2016, and just nine countries have 90 per cent of 
the world’s coal reserves. 
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a significant role in reducing the disparity in natural resource endowment of countries by 
allowing resources to move from areas of excess supply to areas of excess demand. Moreover, 
due to the excessive fixed costs in extracting the resources, large-scale extraction is required to 
achieve economies of scale. Large-scale production is only beneficial if there is a large market 
for exports of that resource. Overall, international trade is associated with a more efficient 
allocation of natural resources that leads to an increase in social welfare. 
Another important feature of natural resources is the dominant position of this sector in 
national economies. Many of resource-rich countries tend to rely on a narrow range of export 
products. Figure 3 shows the value of export product concentration index (PCI) of different 
countries along with shares of natural resources in total merchandise exports for selected 
economies.12 The PCI is based on the number of products in the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) at the three-digit level that exceeds 0.3 per cent of a given country’s 
exports collected from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Dominance of fuel resource exports countries with high PCI 
                                                            
12
 The PCI shows to what extent exports and imports of individual countries or country groups are concentrated 
on several products rather than being distributed homogeneously among products. It is measured as: 
PCI = √∑ (𝑥𝑖,𝑗)2𝑋𝑗  − √1/𝑛𝑛𝑖=1 1− √1/𝑛  x100  
where, 𝑥𝑖,𝑗 is the value of exports of products i from economy j and n is the number of product groups according 
to SITC, Revision 3, at the three-digit level. 
10 
 
 
              Source: Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD (2016) and WB (2019). 
Figure 3 shows that the share of fuel in Kuwait, Brunei, Iraq and Angola is close to 100 
per cent of total merchandise exports by 2015. With very few exceptions, countries with a high 
concentration index also have a high share of fuel resources in their total merchandise exports. 
The dominance of natural resources in exports follows the hypothesis of comparative 
advantage theory, arguing that countries will specialise in the production of goods where they 
have a comparative advantage and export them in exchange for other products. This is a direct 
implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin model which proposes that countries export what they can 
produce. 
Overall, the above-described two characteristics of natural resources explain the 
importance of international trade to the efficient distribution of natural resources. As the 
government’s revenue in resource-rich countries depends on one or few resources, if there are 
trade barriers then total revenue will decrease, causing slower economic growth. For example, 
Iran’s government revenue and economic growth largely depended on the export of crude oil. 
However, due to some international restrictions, Iran cannot produce and sell oil at the optimum 
level and thus is forced to sell in the domestic market at a lower price. Consequently, Iran loses 
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revenue, hampering economic growth. In general, economic growth largely depends on trade 
openness, especially for resource-rich economies. 
 
4. Methodology 
To explore the impact of oil rent (% of GDP) on economic growth, we use the cross-section 
and period fixed effect model (combined model). Other five-panel data estimation models—
pooled least square (PLS) model, cross-section fixed effect model, cross-section random effect 
model, period fixed effect model, period random effect model—are also considered for 
robustness. The combined model allows us to eliminate bias arising from both unobservable 
variables that differ over time and across countries. For example, real GDP, trade and oil rent 
will differ between countries due to their differing geographies, natural endowments, political 
and cultural systems and other basic factors. These variables, however, do not differ over time. 
On the other hand, technological development or international agreements can change 
productivity growth globally which increases output over time. Period fixed effect model 
removes the effect of those country-invariant characteristics. Consequently, the combined fixed 
effect model removes the effect of those time-invariant and cross-section invariant 
characteristics from the model so that we can assess the net impact of oil rent (% of GDP) on 
economic growth. We adopt the following combined model to examine the impact of oil rent 
on economic growth: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑡 +  𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                   (1) 
Where ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the change in log of real GDP per capita; ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the 
lag in the change in log of real GDP per capita; 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 indicates the log in oil rent (% of GDP); 𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 indicate log in unemployment rate (% of total labor force), 
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log in foreign direct investment (% of GDP), log in current account balance (% of GDP) and 
log in military expense (% of GDP) respectively; 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the infant mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live births); and 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 represents the log of trade openness (% of GDP). A detailed 
description of the variables included in equation (1) is presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
The subscripts i and t denote country and period respectively. 𝛽0𝑖  and 𝛽0𝑡  are the 
unobserved time-invariant and country-invariant individual effect respectively and the 
idiosyncratic disturbance term is denoted by Ɛ𝑖,𝑡. By using lag dependent variable, we capture 
autocorrelation in the model. In this study, we also include an interaction term in equation (1), 
denoted by 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡, to examine the hypothesis that trade openness significantly reduces 
the resource curse. The trade openness variable has been interacted with other variables in the 
literature. For example, Haddad et al. (2013) estimate the interaction term between trade 
openness and economic growth volatility. They find that trade openness reduces economic 
growth volatility. Oil resources has been used as an interactive term with government 
fractionalization by Bjorvatn, Farzanegan & Schneider (2012). More broadly, natural resources 
endowments have been interacting with institutional quality (see, e.g., Boschini, Pettersson & 
Roine 2007). They show that the impact of natural resources on economic growth is non-
monotonic in institutional quality.  
In equation (1), we use estimates for the full sample period (1980–2017) and for the 
two subsample periods (1980–1994 and 1995–2017) to allow us to examine the role of WTO 
on the resource curse. We also estimate equation (1) for the alternative measures of trade 
openness [such as exports (% of GDP) and imports (% of GDP)] and natural resource rents (% 
of GDP). 
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5. Data and description of the variables 
In this section, we discuss the definition of the variables and sources of the data. We also 
discuss the characteristics of the data such as unit root, descriptive statistics and correlation 
matrix of the variables. 
5.1. The data 
To estimate the models, this study employs an unbalanced annual panel data dataset for 95 
countries covering the period 1980–2017, where the countries and period included are 
determined by data availability. List of 95 countries are documented in Table A2 in Appendix 
A. The data for real GDP per capita, oil rent, foreign direct investment, current account balance, 
military expense, infant mortality rate and trade openness are collected from the World 
Development Indicator (WDI) of the WB. Unemployment rate data are collected from the 
World Economic Outlook of the IMF.  
5.2. Unit root test, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
We test the stationarity for all variables using the Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat (assume 
individual unit root process) and the Levin, Lin and Chu test. A stationary variable is 
characterised of having constant mean and variance over time, and the covariance between two 
values in the series depends on the length of the time rather than on the actual times when the 
value is observed. With the exception of log of real GDP per capita, all variables included in 
the model are stationary ( p = 0.05). The p-value of log real GDP per capita is >0.05 in case of 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat, indicating that this variable is not stationary. To make the series 
stationary, we take the first difference of this series. The results of the unit root, descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Tables A3, A4 and A5 respectively in 
Appendix A. 
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6. Results and discussion 
In this section, we describe all empirical results estimated by six estimation methods—pooled 
OLS model, cross-section fixed effect model, cross-section random effect model, period fixed 
effect model, period random effect model, and combined fixed effects model. In Section 6.1, 
we describe the estimated coefficients for the full sample period (1980–2017) and two 
subsample periods (1980–1994 and 1995–2017) estimated with the combined fixed effect 
model. 
6.1. Main results 
Table 1 reports the results. In this section, we only discuss the coefficient of the variables of 
interest—log in oil rent, log in trade openness and the interaction term between log in oil rent 
and log in trade openness. Other coefficients are consistent with the literature. The coefficient 
of the oil rent is negative, indicating that the change in real GDP per capita decreases with the 
increase in oil rent and the estimated elasticity is –0.04 (see column 1 in Table 1). Other things 
being equal, a one per cent increase in oil rent is associated with a decrease in change in real 
GDP per capita of around 0.04 per cent. This negative association between growth in real GDP 
per capita and oil rent is evidence of the resource curse. 
The positive coefficient of trade openness indicates that trade openness positively 
affects growth in real GDP per capita. The coefficient of the interaction term between log in 
trade openness and log in oil rent is also positive, indicating that opening to trade reduces the 
negative impact of oil rent on the change of real GDP per capita. These results are significant 
(p = 0.01) and consistent with different time and country fixed effect and random effect models. 
The growth impact of a marginal increase in oil rent implied from equation (1) is: 
                                       𝑑(∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)𝑑(𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡) =  − 0.04 +  0.01 (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)  
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We see that the resource curse is weaker when there is a higher level of trade openness. 
The coefficient of oil rent is –0.04, but when we add the value of the interaction term, the value 
of the coefficient becomes smaller (–0.04 + 0.01 = –0.03 < –0.04). Statistically, we can 
observe that resource curse decreases by 25% with the opening to trade. In the case of cross-
section fixed effect model (column 3 in Table 1), the size of the coefficients of oil rent, trade 
openness and interaction term are similar to the combined model. However, the size of the 
coefficients is much smaller in the PLS and random effect models (columns 2, and 4 in Table 
1). One plausible reason is that in the PLS and random effect models, the unobservable 
variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with all the observed variables. As a result, the size 
of the coefficient is smaller than the combined fixed effect model (–0.02). There are some 
major differences in the coefficients for the combined fixed effect and random effect models, 
which might reflect the importance of omitted variable bias in the latter. In the period fixed 
effect and period random effect models, the size of the coefficient is smaller than the cross-
section fixed effect and the combined fixed effect models, indicating that country-invariant 
unobservable variables such as different agreements and laws are not correlated with the 
observed variables (see columns 5 and 6 in Table 1). 
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Table 1: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) in sample period (1980–
2017). 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 Cross-section 
and period fixed 
(1) 
Pooled 
OLS 
(2) 
Cross-section 
fixed 
(3) 
Cross-section 
random 
(4) 
Period 
fixed 
(5) 
Period 
random 
(6) ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.40*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.36*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.46*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  –0.04*** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
–0.02*** 
(0.007) 
[0.01] 
–0.04*** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
–0.02*** 
(0.007) 
[0.01] 
–0.01*** 
(0.006) 
[0.009] 
–0.01*** 
(0.006) 
[0.009] 𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  –0.0007 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.0001 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 
0.0001 
(0.0009) 
[0.001] 𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  –0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
0.005 
(0.006) 
[0.004] 
0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 –0.08** 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
–0.04* 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.05* 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
–0.04* 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.06** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
–0.06** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 –0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.002] 
0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
[0.001] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.0009] 
0.001** 
(0.0008) 
[0.009] 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡  0.009** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
[0.001] 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡*𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
R2 0.31 0.26 0.16 0.26 0.42 0.42 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Note: The number of countries are 95 and the number of periods are 38 for all the regressions in this table. Standard 
errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. ***, ** and * indicate the significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
To investigate the impact of the WTO, we split our full sample period (1980–2017) into 
two subsample periods (1980–1994 and 1995–2017). We hypothesise that the introduction of 
the WTO on 1st January 1995 may have significantly increased international trade and thereby, 
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reduced the resource curse.13 According to Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz (2007) and Tomz, 
Goldstein and Rivers (2007), participation in the WTO substantially increased trade for the 
whole world. Moreover, Nicita, Olarreaga and Silva (2013) show that the average country 
would face a 32 per cent increase in tariffs on their exports in the absence of the WTO. 
In Table 2, we present the empirical findings on the nexus between real GDP per capita 
and oil rent for the two subsample periods (1980–1994 in column 1 and 1995–2017 in column 
2) and compare these with the full sample period. The coefficient of the oil rent in the period 
1980–1994 is negative, and the estimated elasticity is –0.05 (column 1 in Table 2). All other 
things being equal, a one per cent increase in the oil rent is associated with a significant 
decrease in the change of real GDP per capita of around 0.05 per cent on average. The size of 
the coefficient is about 40% and 20% higher than subsample period 1995–2017 (column 2 in 
Table 2) and the full sample period 1980–2017 (column 3 in Table 2) respectively. 
From column 2 in Table 2, we observe that the coefficient of interaction term (between 
log in oil rent and log in trade openness) is positive and statistically significant during the 
period 1995–2017. This result indicates that trade openness has a significant impact on 
reducing the resource curse during that period. However, we do not find any statistically 
significant impact of trade openness during the period 1980–1994 (refer to column 1), although 
the coefficient is positive and similar with the other periods.  
                                                            
13
 We split sample periods based on the introduction of the WTO, not the GATT, because most economies started 
following the WTO’s rules and regulations in 1995 (124 countries in 1995 and 164 in 2017), prior to the GATT 
in 1947. 
18 
 
Table 2: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) in different sample periods. 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 1980–1994 
(1) 
1995–2017 
(2) 
1980–2017 
(3) ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 0.32*** 
(0.04) 
[0.05] 
0.36*** 
(0.02) 
[0.03] 
0.40*** 
(0.01) 
[0.03] 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  –0.05* 
(0.03) 
[0.03] 
–0.03* 
(0.01) 
[0.02] 
–0.04*** 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡 –0.004 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
–0.0007 
(0.001) 
[0.003] 𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  0.25 
(0.24) 
[0.23] 
–0.001 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 
–0.002 
(0.005) 
[0.004] 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 –0.28** 
(0.11) 
[0.22] 
–0.07** 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 
–0.08** 
(0.03) 
[0.04] 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 –0.04*** 
(0.01) 
[0.02] 
–0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
–0.01*** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 –0.00009 
(0.02) 
[0.02] 
0.01*** 
(0.005) 
[0.005] 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.004] 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡  0.02* 
(0.01) 
[0.01] 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.006] 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
[0.004] 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡*𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  0.01 
(0.008) 
[0.008] 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
[0.005] 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
[0.003] 
R2 0.15 0.29 0.31 
Periods 15 23 38 
Countries 57 95 95 
Observations 564 1,935 2,499 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. ***, ** and * indicate 
the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
 
From the above discussion, it is concluded that there is a negative relationship between 
the oil rent and the change of real GDP per capita; that is, the resource curse. We also provide 
evidence that trade openness can reduce the resource curse. 
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6.2. Marginal effect 
Marginal effect tells us how the dependent variable changes when a specific explanatory 
variable change in the regression analysis. In the case of continuous variables, marginal effect 
measures the instantaneous rate of change. Marginal effect provides a good estimate to the 
amount of change in the dependent variable that is observed due to a change in the independent 
variables. In the context of commodity prices and economic growth, marginal effects have been 
used in the literature. For example, Arezki & Brückner (2012) evaluate the marginal effect of 
commodity windfalls on net foreign assets. Van der Ploeg (2011) found that marginal effect of 
natural resources increases economic growth. Brueckner, Norris, & Gradstein (2015) estimate 
the marginal effect of economic growth on income inequality. 
In this study, we compute the marginal effect of oil rent on the change in GDP per capita. Based 
on the estimates in Table 1, this produced: 
                                      
𝑑(∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)𝑑(𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡) =  − 0.04 +  0.01 (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)                                 (2) 
From the above equation, we can see that the marginal effect of oil rent on the change 
in real GDP per capita is an increasing function of trade openness. Figure 4a plots the marginal 
effect, 𝑑(∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)𝑑(𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡) , on the Y-axis and trade openness on the X-axis. From this plot, we can 
observe that the marginal effect of the oil rent on economic growth is an increasing function of 
trade openness in the full sample period. We also observe from Figure 4a that this effect 
becomes positive and significant with higher trade openness. In Figures 4b and 4c, we present 
the marginal effect of trade openness on GDP for the sample period 1980–1994 and 1995–2017 
respectively, and we observe that in the sample period 1980–1994 there is no significant impact 
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of trade openness on GDP. So, the results in the sample period 1995–2017 led to the results for 
the full sample period.14 
    Figure 4a: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (full sample period 1980–2017) 
 
          Figure 4b: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (sample period 1980–1994) 
 
 
                                                            
14 The figures of all robust analysis are presented in online Appendix C (Figures C1, C2, C3, C4, and C5). 
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           Figure 4c: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (sample period 1995–2017) 
 
6.3. Robustness results 
To check the robustness of the results, we use two alternative measures of trade openness—
exports (% of GDP) and imports (% of GDP).15 Our empirical findings show that the resource 
curse reduces with the increase of both exports and imports. With the increase of exports, 
economies can gain access to international prices and earn more revenue from royalties, 
thereby increasing real GDP per capita. On the other hand, countries can import advance 
technologies to more efficiently extract oil resources and/or produce final products to earn more 
revenue that increases real GDP per capita. For further robustness, we use natural resource rent 
(% of GDP) instead of oil rent (% of GDP) as a measure of resource abundance and find similar 
results.16 All robustness findings are presented in Tables B1–B5 in online Appendix B. We 
                                                            
15
 Exports (% of GDP) and Imports (% of GDP) represent the value of all goods and services provided and received 
to and from the rest of the world respectively.  
16
 Natural resource rent (% of GDP) is the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents and forest 
rents. Data for Exports (% of GDP), Imports (% of GDP) and natural resource rent (% of GDP) are collected from 
the WDI of the WB. 
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also use a dummy variable that contains the value 1 for the years following the establishment 
of the WTO and, 0 otherwise in the regression but not shown in the Tables.  
6.3.1 The Mediation Model 
To identify trade openness as a channel of mitigating the resource curse, we further use a 
structural equation model. In particular, we follow Powdthavee and Wooden (2015) 
methodology (mediation model) but in a different context; to identify the direct and indirect 
effects of oil rent on GDP growth through the trade openness. Table 3 presents the direct and 
indirect effects of oil rent on GDP growth.17 The coefficient of oil rent is - 0.003 in case of 
direct effect. In terms of the indirect effect, when oil rent effects GDP growth through the trade 
openness, the coefficient is - 0.0007 which is lower than the direct effect. Our empirical 
findings indicate that the adverse impact of oil rent on GDP growth decreases with the presence 
of trade openness supporting our hypothesis that trade openness reduces the oil resource curse.  
Table 3: Estimated direct and indirect effects of oil rent on GDP growth through the trade 
openness 
 
Variable GDP growth 
Direct Indirect Total 
Oil rent - 0.003*** 
(0.008) 
- 0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
- 0.004*** 
(0.0008) 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. ***, ** and * indicate 
the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
 
6.4. Discussion of the results 
Overall, the panel data regression models suggest that having an abundance of oil resources 
plays a significant role in slowing economic growth—that is, it serves as a resource curse. 
Many reasons have been put forward in the literature for this surprising result, including rent-
seeking behaviour, poor institutional quality, commodity price volatility and lack of 
                                                            
17
 Although we are calling the product of two coefficients the ‘indirect effect’, it is nothing more than just a 
simple indirect association between oil rent and GDP growth via a mediating variable namely trade openness. It 
does not imply any causality.    
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diversification. In this study, we investigated the impact of trade openness in reducing the 
resource curse. Our empirical findings show that trade openness significantly decreases the 
resource curse in our full sample period (1980–2017). More open trade policies provide access 
to advanced technologies that increase efficiency by reallocating the factors of production. 
These trade policies also facilitate access to large markets where increasing competition drives 
innovations and strengthens managerial skills which in turn generates substantial economic 
growth. Accordingly, Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2011) report that the resource curse has turned 
into a blessing in countries with a high degree of trade openness such as Australia, Bolivia, 
Barbados, Canada, Chile, Malaysia and the United States. 
To understand the role of the WTO in increasing merchandise trade, we split our sample 
period into two subsample periods, 1980–1994 (pre-WTO) and 1995–2017 (post-WTO). Our 
empirical findings suggest that trade openness had a significant impact on reducing the resource 
curse for the sample period 1995–2017. However, there was no significant effect for the sample 
period 1980–1994, possibly due to the fact that total merchandise trade increased after the 
commencement of the WTO in 1995, which helped to weaken the strength of the dynamics 
driving the resource curse. 
Overall, based on our empirical findings, we can argue that outward-looking trade 
policy is helpful for economic growth and reduces the risk of experiencing the resource curse. 
Therefore, policymakers should concentrate on how they can make the economy more open by 
reducing existing tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Increased international trade (both export and 
import) helps economies to be more efficient by enabling the adoption of new technologies and 
sharing of advanced knowledge which generates long-run economic growth. 
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7. Conclusion  
This study aims to revisit the resource curse paradox and examines the role of trade openness 
in reducing the resource curse. Using different dynamic panel data models for 95 countries for 
the period 1980–2017, this study finds that economic growth decreases with the increase of oil 
resource abundance. A one per cent increase in oil rent causes a 0.04 per cent decrease in real 
GDP per capita. Although our empirical findings support the resource curse hypothesis, the 
study finds that trade openness is a possible channel to reduce the resource curse. On average, 
trade openness reduces the negative effect of oil rent on real GDP per capita by 25%. Trade 
openness allows countries to obtain competitive prices for their resources in the international 
market and access advanced technologies to more efficiently extract resources. We also find 
that trade openness significantly affects the resource curse after the introduction of the WTO. 
An important policy implication is that natural resource–rich economies that want to reduce 
the resource curse should consider further opening their economies. 
The policy implications of this study are that international trade policies that promote 
trade openness (such as, tariff reduction or free trade agreements) reduces the oil curse. Our 
study shows that around 25% of the decline in GDP per capita caused by the oil curse can be 
mitigated by trade opening policies. In this regard policies adopted from WTO since 1995 has 
had a significant impact on reducing the oil curse.  
This study can be extended by focusing on other possible transmission channels of the 
resource curse such as income inequality. According to Fum and Hodler (2010) and Parcero 
and Papyrakis (2016), income inequality is high in resource-rich countries, especially those 
with point-source resources. One reason is that inefficient allocation of resources among 
sectors increases income inequality. Trade openness plays an important role in reallocating 
resources in the sectors where a country has a comparative advantage. This efficient 
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distribution of resources helps to reduce income inequality in resource-rich countries and, thus, 
spurs economic growth. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Description of the variables 
Variables Mnemonic Description Source 
Dependent variable      
Real GDP per capita 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by mid-year 
population. Data are in constant 2010 
US dollars. 
WDI, WB 
Control variables      
Oil rents (% of GDP) 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 Oil rents are the difference between the 
value of crude oil production at 
regional prices and total costs of 
production. We add 1 before 
converting into logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Unemployment rate (% 
of total labour force) 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡 Unemployment rate can be defined by 
the OECD harmonised definition. The 
OECD harmonised unemployment rate 
gives the number of unemployed 
persons as a percentage of the labour 
force. 
World 
Economic 
Outlook, IMF 
Foreign direct 
investment, net 
outflows (% of GDP) 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Foreign direct investment refers to 
direct investment equity flows in an 
economy. This data series shows net 
outflows of investment from the 
reporting economy to the rest of the 
world and is divided by GDP. We add 
100 before converting into logarithmic 
form. 
WDI, WB 
Current account balance 
(% of GDP) 
 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 Current account balance is the sum of 
net exports of goods and services, net 
primary income and net secondary 
income. We add 250 to convert 
logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Military expense (% of 
GDP) 
 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Military expenditures data from SIPRI 
are derived from the NATO definition, 
which includes all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forces. We 
add 1 to convert logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Mortality rate, infant 
(per 1,000 live births) 
 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 Infant mortality rate is the number of 
infants dying before reaching one year 
of age, per 1,000 live births in a given 
year. 
WDI, WB 
Trade openness (% of 
GDP) 
𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 Trade is the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services measured as a 
share of GDP. 
WDI, WB 
Note: We use first difference to get the data in stationary in real GDP per capita series and expressed as ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡. 
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Table A2: List of countries (n = 95) 
Albania China Indonesia Mexico Serbia 
Algeria Colombia Iran Moldova Seychelles 
Argentina Costa Rica Irelands Mongolia Singapore 
Armenia Croatia Israel Morocco Slovak Rep. 
Australia Cyprus Italy Netherlands Slovenia 
Austria Czech Rep. Jamaica New Zealand South Africa 
Azerbaijan Denmark Japan Nicaragua Spain 
Bahrain Dominican Rep. Jordan Nigeria Sri Lanka 
Belarus Ecuador Kazakhstan Norway Sweden 
Belgium Egypt, Arab Rep. Korea, Rep. Pakistan Switzerland  
Belize El Salvador Kuwait Panama Thailand 
Bolivia Estonia Kyrgyz Rep. Paraguay Tunisia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Finland Latvia Peru Turkey 
Brazil France Lithuania Philippines Ukraine 
Brunei Darussalam Georgia Luxemburg Poland The UK 
Bulgaria Germany Macedonia, North Portugal The USA 
Cabo Verde Greece Malaysia Romania Uruguay 
Canada Honduras Malta Russian Federation Venezuela 
Chile Hungary Mauritius Saudi Arabia Vietnam 
 
 
Table A3: Unit root test 
 Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat Levin, Lin & Chu t* 
 At level 1st difference At level 1st difference 
 statistics p-value statistics p-value statistics p-value statistics p-value 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 5.58 0.99 -25.43 0.00 -3.18 0.00 - - 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 -33.10 0.00 - - -102.41 0.00 - - 𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡 -6.78 0.00 - - -6.78 0.00 - - 𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 -11.55 0.00 - - -6.71 0.00 - - 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 -9.97 0.00 - - -7.49 0.00 - - 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 -1.96 0.02 - - -5.28 0.00 - - 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 -2.5 0.00  -- -6.92 0.00 - - 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 -3.60 0.00 - - -5.21 0.00 - - 
Note: 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  = Log of real GDP per capita, 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  = Log of oil rent, 𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡   = Log of unemployment rate,  𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡= Log of foreign direct investment, 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = Log of current account balance, 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡= Log of military 
expense, 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = Log of mortality rate, 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = Log of trade openness. 
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics 
 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡   𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡  𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡  
Mean 0.02 0.56 1.98 4.62 5.51 1.06 2.41 4.29 
Median 0.02 0.04 2.01 4.61 5.51 1.02 2.39 4.28 
Maximum 0.28 4.13 3.61 5.76 5.68 3.05 4.76 6.08 
Minimum –0.18 0.000 –3.68 2.33 5.32 0.00 0.53 2.44 
Std. Dev. 0.03 0.90 0.64 0.11 0.02 0.46 0.87 0.56 
Skewness –0.35 1.83 –0.80 –5.42 0.62 0.54 0.17 0.11 
Kurtosis 7.28 5.66 6.50 162.17 9.06 4.11 2.29 3.54 
Observations 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 
Note: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = Change in log of real GDP per capita, 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = Log of oil rent, 𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  = Log of unemployment 
rate, 𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = Log of foreign direct investment, 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡  = Log of current account balance, 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = Log of 
military expense, 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = Log of mortality rate, 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = Log of trade openness. 
 
Table A5: Correlation matrix 
 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡   𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡  𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡  ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 1.00        𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 –0.02 1.00       𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡 –0.03 –0.14 1.00      𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 0.008 –0.01 –0.04 1.00     𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 –0.09 0.36 –0.26 0.07 1.00    𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 –0.06 0.18 –0.02 –0.02 0.15 1.00   𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.04 0.28 0.17 –0.14 –0.20 0.09 1.00  𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 0.13 –0.16 –0.17 0.09 0.06 –0.19 –0.32 1.00 
Note: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = Change in log of real GDP per capita, 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = Log of oil rent, 𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  = Log of unemployment 
rate, 𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = Log of foreign direct investment, 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡  = Log of current account balance, 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = Log of 
military expense, 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = Log of mortality rate, 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = Log of trade openness. 
 
